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1 Introduction 
 
This report summarises and analyses donor responses to the closure of civic space around 
the world. It is part of a wider effort within the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation (SDC) to enable joint learning to support SDC offices in dealing with the 
growing challenges they encounter in restrained or shrinking spaces for civil society. 
Through knowledge-sharing and exchange, it proposes to improve the quality of SDC 
operations by articulating existing internal discussions, promoting reflective practices on the 
shrinking space for civil society, and advising SDC on how to respond to this trend. 
 
Specifically, the report provides:  
 an overview of the main characteristics and drivers of restricted or shrinking space 
for civil society, highlighting the systemic challenges to an enabling environment for 
civil society 
 an overview of existing response strategies and approaches based on the 
international literature on the topic 
 a review of current intractable questions and gaps in response strategies, including 
those generated by the survey of SDC offices, and considering the feasibility of 
different guiding approaches. 
 
Through the joint learning, the report aims to generate recommendations for different levels 
of the organisational response (SDC headquarters, SDC offices, civil society organisations 
(CSOs)), supporting the SDC discussion on response strategies. 
 
The report is organised as follows. Section 2 addresses the characteristics and drivers of 
closing civic space, discussing why this is occurring across different countries, political 
systems, and levels of development. Section 3 discusses why civic space is so important for 
donors, exploring considerations of human rights and of the contributions of civil society to 
sustainable, inclusive development. Section 4 reviews the literature on the donor ‘pushback’ 
or responses to closing civic space, and develops a simple framework for categorising the 
actions being taken, the gaps in donor actions, and what actions are feasible within different 
political settings. This framework is used in Section 5 to categorise donor responses 
according to whether they are making a strategic, operational, alliance-building or evidence-
building contribution to the pushback against shrinking space. Section 6 discusses the 
implications of this work, and how it may be used in SDC’s joint learning. 
 
2  Closing civic space: characteristics and 
drivers 
 
2.1 Definitions and meanings 
Civil society is defined as the voluntary middle space or ‘third sector’ alongside the state and 
markets. The term commonly refers to a range of social action and actors from local 
voluntary social groups, to transnational human rights organisations and non-government 
organisations (NGOs), as well as wider social movements and popular struggles. Civil 
society tends to be closely shaped by the space created by the state, and by its multiple 
relationships to the state. A rise in international aid to civil society since the end of the cold 
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war means that civil society is also closely shaped by transnational relationships and 
powers.1  
 
Within international development thinking, civil society is usually associated with voluntary 
organisations and associations. For the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
civil society: 
 
comprises the full range of formal and informal organizations within civil society: 
NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), indigenous peoples’ organizations 
(IPOs), academia, journalist associations, faith-based organizations, trade unions, 
and trade associations. 
(UNDP 2006: 3) 
 
The World Bank takes a narrower view of civil society that excludes economic interest 
groups, defining it as: 
 
the wide array of non-governmental and not for profit organizations that have a 
presence in public life, express the interests and values of their members and others, 
based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic 
considerations. 
(The World Bank website) 
 
Broader definitions of civil society encompass a wider range of forms of action, such as 
social movements, protest movements, digital or online activism, as well as struggles over 
economic (e.g. land or labour) rights. While the media is often understood to play a critical 
role in creating space for debate and information, for-profit media organisations have 
different goals from CSOs and are usually treated as separate or distinct from them.  
 
 
2.2 Restrictions on civil society 
Civic space – or the scope for civil society to operate without fear of incurring official 
disapproval, hostility, violence or abuse, or without breaking laws or regulations – has 
narrowed across all regions of the world in the past two decades. This is happening in 
countries at all levels of economic and human development, and under all types of political 
regime. Monitoring of civic space shows that civic freedoms were restricted in more than 100 
countries in 2016. Some 3.2 billion people now live in countries where civic space is closed 
or controlled (CIVICUS 2016a; 2016b; other sources cited in Hossain et al. 2018). 
 
Instruments of closing civic space range from legal and administrative measures to 
defamation, intimidation and violence. A variety of civil society actors and social movements 
have faced efforts to restrict their activities. Among these, some of the most prominent 
struggles have been over land, and there has been an epidemic of violence against land 
rights defenders, often indigenous peoples. Other target groups include: labour 
organisations and activists; environmental, women’s and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender 
and intersex (LGBTI) rights activists; journalists, bloggers, scholars, writers, artists and 
students; democracy and free speech campaigners; groups monitoring corruption, natural 
resource extraction, and economic governance; and ordinary citizens protesting public 
policies (e.g. devaluation, fiscal policy). Online civic space has also been subject to closures, 
distortions and shutdowns as governments seek to manage public discourse. It has also 
been subject to manipulation by domestic or foreign interests. 
 
                                               
1  This summary explanation of civil society is drawn from a literature review conducted for two separate research 
commissions on closing civic space and the implications for development, one for ACT Alliance, and the second for the 
Department for International Development (DFID). See Hossain et al. 2018 or here for more details. 
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A survey of SDC offices found that closing civic space was often taking the form of 
delegitimisation. In several countries, governments did not recognise a role for civil society in 
representing the interests of the people and argued that only elections could confer 
legitimacy on actors claiming to represent the people. In some places, civil society actors 
were being branded as ‘anti-state’ or ‘foreign agents’. The survey found that a wide range of 
restrictive measures were in place, including restrictive legislation, administrative hurdles for 
CSOs (registration, tax, reporting, requirements for holding bank accounts, etc.), closing 
down NGOs and media houses, surveillance, intimidation, judicial proceedings, threats, 
arrests, enforced disappearances, and even murder. Certain issues, including ethnic 
minority rights, gender-based violence, lesbian, LGBTI rights, land rights, extraction of 
natural resources/mining, anti-corruption, civic education, and human rights were recurring 
and acutely sensitive areas. Civil society actors and the media were self-censoring. In some 
contexts, survey respondents noted that civil society leaders were being co-opted by 
government, and that elsewhere, government-sponsored NGOs were crowding out other 
CSOs.  
 
The SDC survey also identified a series of reasons why governments seek to restrict the 
space for civil society. These include wanting to reduce the space for civil society actors in 
reaction to losing votes (it is often after elections that governments clamp down on civil 
society and media organisations seen to have been supportive of the opposition). 
Governments may also treat CSOs as competitors for official development assistance (ODA) 
and seek to reduce their legal channels for receiving donor funding. Some governments 
restrict civil society activity on grounds that they think it may be connected to or enabling 
terrorism or money laundering, or that civil society activities are working against national 
stability or economic development. Governments may also be induced to restrict the space 
for civil society by the private sector, in order to pave the way for lucrative development or 
other deals opposed by civil society. 
 
The SDC staff survey found that not all problems in the enabling environment for civil society 
resulted from closures of space. Some weaknesses reflected other aspects of the different 
settings that civil society operates in, such as the following.  
 
 When there is strong competition between civil society and its coalitions and 
networks over funds.  
 When CSOs have strong political affiliations or, in some contexts, pursue anti-
democratic or illiberal agendas. 
 When grass-roots movements turn to violence or violate legitimate laws of the state, 
leading to restrictive legislation.  
 When CSOs themselves are not legitimate and representative of their constituencies, 
thus weakening their credibility, and when formal communication channels between 
CSOs and (local) authorities are weak. 
 When, in the absence of well-informed alternative approaches to improving public 
policy among CSOs, there is a strong risk that the agendas of donors, international 
NGOs or other external actors predominate over domestic solutions and 
consideration of local community priorities. 
These broader concerns about the relationships between civil society and the state have 
shaped the civic space to different degrees across different contexts.  
 
2.3 Effects of closing civic space in different political systems 
A recent body of literature situates this shrinking of civic space within national or domestic 
politics (van der Borgh and Terwindt 2012). These behaviours by political elites are 
borrowed from the ‘dictator’s handbook’ or ‘authoritarian playbook’ and should be seen as 
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part of a coherent set of practices by ruling elites to accumulate power, learned from other 
autocrats. What these settings all share is an effort by political elites to wrest power away 
from CSOs (and human rights defenders, the media and social movements), which elites 
often frame as protecting ‘national sovereignty’ against foreign interests. There is a 
consistency across countries that suggests there has been ‘[l]ateral learning between 
governments seeking to inhibit the work of human rights activists and civil society more 
generally’ (Mendelson 2015: 3).  
 
However, while the patterns of clampdown on civil society look similar across contexts, they 
have distinctly different effects because of how they play out across different political 
systems. The impacts on civil society will not be the same everywhere; what happens to 
civic space in a given country will largely depend on how political power is organised (or 
what is sometimes called ‘the political settlement’) in that country. Whether power is 
distributed or concentrated – that is, whether it is controlled tightly by a coherent group or 
competed over by many actors with varied interests – shapes the space within which civil 
society can operate.  
 
The connections between closures of civic space and national political power struggles can 
be seen most clearly when we recognise that in many countries that have seen new 
restrictions, these have come at a time when, and possibly because, the balance of political 
power is unsettled or shifting. Civil society can play an important role in political systems that 
are moving towards being more plural and competitive; but they may equally be vital actors 
to control or tame if political elites are seeking to concentrate power. For instance, in 
countries that have been experiencing democratisation, and where political settlements are 
becoming more competitive (for example, Nepal or Pakistan in the past few years), ruling 
elites facing competition or scrutiny that threatens their grip on power have strong incentives 
to restrict (some) civil society actors. Those associated with important minority groups, 
opposition strongholds or secessionist tendencies are particularly likely to face suppression 
or hostility in such contexts.  
 
Overall, more democratic systems tend to create more political opportunities and resources 
for civic activism. Democracies typically create the conditions for civil societies with strong 
grass-roots and popular connections, spaces for state–civil society engagement, and 
transnational linkages and alliances. Civic activism can be relatively resilient in such 
settings. The resilience of civil society is currently being tested in Brazil, whose new far-right 
government has targeted the country’s strong base of social movements to pave the way for 
environmental exploitation and swingeing austerity measures. These new policies threaten 
to reverse Brazil’s hard-won progress on social and economic equality in the 2000s (Sauer 
et al. 2019).  
 
In non-democratic countries where power is concentrated within a small political elite group, 
civic space will be affected by whether or not elites seek to build their legitimacy through 
economic and social performance. In countries like Rwanda, Ethiopia, Cambodia and 
Bangladesh, civil society has the potential to be an important ally in economic and social 
development, to deliver services to excluded groups, or otherwise support government 
policies and programmes. But in these same countries where a small coherent elite coalition 
exercises tight control over political power, new restrictions typically weaken civil society, 
reducing its role to supportive functions without scope for scrutiny or holding government to 
account. Ruling elites create pressures to align with the ruling party agenda, and to refrain 
from criticism or dissent. Such ‘dominant’ political elites often seek to boost economic 
performance with big development or energy projects, and silence or undermine civil society 
activism in order to get socially unjust or environmentally unsustainable projects through. 
Where authoritarian rulers have a secure hold on power but lack incentives to deliver on 
economic or social performance (Zimbabwe, for instance), new restrictions on civil society 
aim to keep it weak and voiceless, continuing or renewing an older pattern. Such ‘predatory’ 
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political settlements create few opportunities for civic activism, other than the special and 
rare instances of large-scale democratic revolts. In such systems, civil society tends to be 
weak and dependent on external resources, chronically vulnerable to the threat of violence, 
expulsion or criminalisation. 
 
A key conclusion is that it helps to think about how relationships between civil society and 
the state are affected by new restrictions not in terms of ‘space’ but as shaping ‘the fit’ 
between civic groups and public authorities. The distance and autonomy to scrutinise or 
monitor public authorities is not the only factor to consider when assessing civic space; the 
capacity to influence change is also critical, and this sometimes means getting closer to 
governments. This in turn means that under different arrangements of political power, 
restrictions on civic space will play out differently depending on this fit between state and 
civil society actors. Efforts by donors to respond to restrictions on civic space can usefully 
pay attention to these political economy dynamics in tailoring their approaches to the 
situation in different countries (Hossain et al. 2018).  
 
Struggles over civic space are also contests over norms, reflecting competing worldviews 
and values. Where CSOs have been dependent on foreign aid, this has made them 
vulnerable to accusations of furthering foreign interests, and of being accountable to donors 
rather than to the people they are supposed to serve. In several countries, restrictions on 
aid-funded civil society groups with strong transnational links have been justified by 
nationalists as resistance to the imposition of foreign values and agendas. In addition, while 
civic space has been shrinking for some groups (mainly in a human rights and liberal or 
social democratic tradition), others, including right-wing and illiberal groups, have been 
welcomed and recognised by the new political right. While this is most notable in Europe and 
the United States, right-wing populist leaders have also been elected in Brazil, India, 
Pakistan, and the Philippines, in recent years.  
 
New restrictions on civil society tend to have further repercussions for development 
outcomes, as bilateral (official) aid flows tend to drop by almost one-third in the years after 
governments introduce new restrictions on NGO funds. This is largely due to donors being 
unable to find ways of financing their preferred civil society partners (Dupuy and Prakash 
2017).  
 
3  Why civic space matters to international 
donors 
The closing down of civic space is, or should be, a matter of considerable urgency and 
importance for international donors and the wider international community. Some key donor 
allies and CSO recipients of aid are among the primary targets of new restrictions on civic 
space. These targets include: 
 
 mainly foreign-funded formal NGOs and CSOs in developing and transitional 
countries, addressing local concerns from poverty and inequality to the environment 
and corruption, including concerns of indigenous populations and smallholder 
farmers, industrial workers, marginalised groups, those living in extreme poverty, and 
women and children; 
 democratic development and human rights organisations with strong transnational 
connections and funding, with particular mandates to promote political and civic 
rights; 
 social movements and grass-roots organisations and networks of (among others) 
workers, smallholder farmers, women, indigenous peoples, and minority and 
excluded groups; 
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 the parts of the media, academic and artistic channels through which these actors 
investigate and highlight issues, articulate demands and mobilise public opinion in 
the civic space.  
 
SDC has been operating in awareness of these challenges, through its governance portfolio, 
with its Peace- and State-building Strategy, and the New Deal principles of being politically 
relevant and staying engaged. Despite this guidance, the SDC survey identified that there 
were nonetheless, significant impacts on operations, including the following.  
 
 The challenge for SDC partners and civil society more generally to engage with 
power-holders/policymakers, and the need to figure out different strategies to 
maintain relationships at different levels. Access to information is tougher, making it 
difficult to seek accountability. Donors face particular dilemmas when they have to 
submit to unwarranted requirements to enable external support for civil society, and 
this is challenging bilateral relations. 
 A loss of trust between CSOs, as civic space becomes more restricted. 
 Challenges to current and future governance projects as the legitimacy of (local) 
institutions is put in question, along with enhanced risks of contributing to local 
conflict. 
 Partner staff turnover, international staff of international NGOs being refused visas, 
increased insecurity facing staff, etc. 
 A limited number of CSOs capable of meeting donor managerial, administrative and 
fiduciary requirements. 
 Delays or discontinuation of basket fund programmes due to other donor withdrawals 
or lengthy negotiations with governments or partner CSOs being de-registered.  
 Lack of donor flexibility to support community priorities emerging from local research 
and analysis. 
 
The survey of SDC offices and the subsequent discussion of SDC’s Democratisation, 
Decentralisation and Local Governance (DDLG) Network in Kiev in May 2018 identified the 
following reasons why a restricted/shrinking space for civil society is a concern for SDC. 
 In some countries, the state does not recognise a role for civil society in representing 
the interests of the people, and elected leaders/elections are considered the only 
legitimate means of popular representation. This makes it difficult for civil society to 
participate in decision making, and weakens democratic participation. 
 Where civil society has not participated in public policymaking, the state may lack the 
means to be responsive to people’s needs. This may be particularly problematic for 
excluded and marginalised groups in society, whose concerns civil society groups 
often highlight and demand action on behalf of. Unresponsive state policies can 
mean a failure to address poverty. This may in turn lead to frustration, which, over 
time, may threaten the stability of the political system itself. 
 Restricted civic space weakens anti-corruption initiatives and may contribute to 
impunity for corruption. 
 Key issues in contention over civic space include ethnic minority rights, gender-
based violence, LGBTI rights, land rights, extraction of natural resources/mining, 
anti-corruption, civic education, and human rights. Several of these are priority areas 
of SDC’s cooperation in developing countries.  
 
3.1 The intersection of human rights and development  
Tighter restrictions on civic space are also harmful because of their impacts on human rights 
and development outcomes. NGOs and CSOs, activists and organisers, journalists and 
scholars cannot play their role in society, and their rights to free assembly, speech or 
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expression are effectively violated. This in turn is highly likely to mean that the most 
marginalised, disempowered and vulnerable groups will lose protection, resources and 
voice, violating the guiding principles of the Sustainable Development Agenda 2030, of 
inclusion, equality, sustainability, and ‘leaving no one behind’. Therefore, the problem of civic 
space is one in which civic and political rights – of free assembly, speech and expression – 
are closely intertwined with economic, social and cultural rights, to livelihoods and land, jobs, 
food security, recognition and dignity, personal security, education, health, and shelter. In 
other words, human rights and ‘frontline’ human development outcomes intersect in the civic 
space. 
 
In setting out a response to the problem in 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights noted that civic space was ‘not optional’ under international human rights law, 
but that it was also necessary for societies to work out their differences peaceably, for 
citizens to participate in public life, to widen contributions to public policymaking, and even to 
cooperate with business to defend basic freedoms (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2016). Successive UN special rapporteurs on 
the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association have taken a strong position 
on the ‘choking’ of civil society for short-term political or business gains (Kiai 2017; OHCHR 
2017a: 6). The current UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and of association underlined their indivisibility from other human rights, explaining that 
these rights are: ‘fundamental rights that form the basis of the full enjoyment of other rights, 
as they enable the exercise of a number of civil, political, economic, cultural and social 
rights’ (OHCHR 2017a). Civil society and its ‘freedom and means to speak, access 
information, associate, organise, and participate in public decision-making – is essential to 
the healthy functioning and development of any society’ (OHCHR 2014). In 2017, after three 
years of monitoring the situation around the world, the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights defenders reported being: 
 
… more appalled than ever to see attacks against [human rights defenders] 
multiplying everywhere, assailing bloggers, indigenous peoples, journalists, 
community leaders, whistle-blowers and community volunteers [and was now] 
convinced that the incidents in question are not isolated acts but concerted attacks 
against those who try to embody the ideal of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in a world free from fear and want. 
(OHCHR 2017b: 3)  
 
3.2 Development effectiveness and civic space 
International aid donors that have supported civil society in the past have done so in the 
belief that civil society participation is essential to development effectiveness, by enabling 
outreach to marginalised groups, protection of rights, scrutiny of aid and policy, and ensuring 
broad attention to inclusion, equity and sustainability. A preparatory forum for the 2016 High-
Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (GPEDC) 
noted that monitoring development progress depended on ‘the number and quality of 
partnerships with businesses, civil society, philanthropies, parliaments, subnational 
governments and trade unions to achieve development goals’, and ‘inclusive mechanisms 
for dialogue and engagement with civil society organisations, with clear goals, mandates and 
expected results’. The forum concluded that governments should ‘improve the policy, legal 
and regulatory environment so civil society and business can maximize their contribution to 
development’, while development partners should support the capacity of governments to 
establish and carry out multi-stakeholder partnerships (Global Partnership for Effective 
Development Co-operation 2017: 37). 
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The Sustainable Development Agenda 2030 Declaration frames development as a matter of 
tackling inequalities of power and resources, with the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) aiming to:  
 
end poverty and hunger everywhere; to combat inequalities within and among 
countries; to build peaceful, just and inclusive societies; to protect human rights and 
promote gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls; and to ensure 
the lasting protection of the planet and its natural resources. 
(United Nations 2015)  
 
Inclusive development outcomes need inclusive processes of development decision making, 
to introduce and institutionalise development outcomes that are sustainable, equitable and 
inclusive, in line with the SDGs (Rocha Menocal 2017). A focus on inclusive forms of 
development also takes account of the fact that rapid economic growth does not necessarily 
entail poverty eradication or human development, nor does it ensure that no one is ‘left 
behind’, as the SDG principles put it.  
 
Evidence indicates that it is the kinds of work civil society does – to raise awareness, 
influence public policymaking, mobilise demand for services, rights, and justice, and monitor 
and hold government and business actors to account – that is most likely to align 
development along these core SDG principles. SDG 16 is a close approximation of ‘civic 
space’, specifically aiming to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable 
development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive 
institutions at all levels’. SDG 16 successfully goes some way towards capturing the 
intersection of human rights with frontline development outcomes, drawing attention to: 
  
a. the direct impacts on civil society actors (reduction of violence and death rates 
(16.1); the rule of law at national and international levels (16.2); access to information 
(16.10); independent human rights institutions (16.a.1); and reduction of organised 
crime and corruption (16.4 and 16.5)); 
b. inclusive development processes (public service user satisfaction (16.6); responsive, 
inclusive, participatory and representative decision making (16.7); broader and 
stronger participation of developing countries in global governance (16.8); and non-
discriminatory laws and policies for sustainable development (16.b)). 
 
However, the full impact of the closing down of civic space for development effectiveness 
will need to combine SDG 16 with the frontline first five human development indicators of 
poverty, hunger and nutrition, health, gender equality, and education, as well as to SDGs 8 
(decent work), 10 (reduced inequalities), and 15 (life on land), as it is in these domains that 
the impacts on SDG 16 are most likely to play out. It will also need to take into account SDG 
17, and the realisation of the necessary partnerships for development.  
 
3.3 Civic space and developmental states 
The strong economic growth and human development performance associated with 
countries with no strong tradition of independent CSOs or liberal civic space, such as China, 
Vietnam, Rwanda and Ethiopia, has challenged the view that such conditions are necessary 
for rapid, broad-based development. The ‘developmental state’ thesis – that ruling elites may 
need to silence critics and repress dissent to buy the long-time horizons needed to kickstart 
economic and social transformations – has been widely used to justify controls on civic 
space across a variety of political–economic settings. Political elites seeking to implement 
large land, energy or extractives projects appear to be particularly willing to take steps to 
silence civil society scrutiny of their impacts on equity or sustainability. However, while 
‘developmental states’ that restrict civic space often feature patterns of development that are 
high-growth and expand service provision rapidly, they are rarely inclusive or 
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environmentally sustainable, and may unleash unequal transformations which leave 
significant groups behind. This is because the kinds of actions taken by civil societies and 
the media in more open societies, to highlight problems and force them on to the public 
agenda, tend to be absent or weak and fragmented in authoritarian states – even those with 
a ‘developmental’ agenda.  
 
There are several good examples of how a weakened civil society or closed civic space may 
adversely affect development outcomes within ‘developmental’ states. In Rwanda, for 
example, restrictions on free speech have prevented activists and researchers from starting 
a public debate about the pace and distribution of poverty reduction. Systematic problems in 
data collection and official statistics go unchallenged, and policies that are likely to lead to 
worsening inequality or pockets of exclusion persist in this context of closed civic space, 
raising questions about the extent and distribution of Rwanda’s achievements in poverty 
reduction (Ansoms et al. 2017). In China, the past two decades saw growing space 
permitted to environmental civic groups, in line with an emphasis on environmentalism within 
the state and ruling party. However, civil society groups operate within strict limits, and are 
generally unable to raise or mobilise mass public opinion around controversial issues, 
helping to explain China’s significant and continuing localised problems of pollution and 
environmental degradation (Tang and Zhan 2008). In Ethiopia, violation of the rights to free 
speech and freedom of association have been associated with pockets of persistent poverty 
and hunger, and specifically with land deals designed to support large-scale agricultural 
modernisation or urban development projects against the wishes of local people and small-
scale farmers. In the absence of other means of voicing their opposition to such policies, a 
series of major protests by people from the Oromo community triggered violent state 
repression, ultimately leading to a change in national leadership in 2018 (Al Jazeera 2018). 
 
 
3.4 An enabling environment for civil society 
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and follow-up statements affirm that civil society 
is a critical partner in development effectiveness. Key commitments include: 
  
 ‘work with CSOs to provide an enabling environment that maximizes their 
contributions to development’; 
 recognising ‘the importance of civil society in sustainable development and in leaving 
no-one behind; in engaging with governments to uphold their commitments; and in 
being development actors in their own right’; 
 recognising the importance of reversing ‘the trend of shrinking of civic space 
wherever it is taking place and to build a positive environment for sustainable 
development, peaceful societies, accountable governance and achievement of the 
SDGs and the 2030 Agenda’; 
 creating an enabling environment for CSOs that ‘maximises their engagement in and 
contribution to development’.  
 
The GPEDC Monitoring Framework measures ‘the extent to which governments and 
development partners contribute to an enabling environment for CSOs; and the extent to 
which CSOs are implementing the development effectiveness principles in their own 
operations’.  
 
Civil society networks and alliances have put forward their views on an enabling 
environment. The Civic Charter’s Global Framework for People’s Participation listed, in 
addition to the protection of civic and political rights, the freedom to accept financial support 
from home and from abroad, and the protection of the law against attacks on their 
organisations and space. The CSO Partnership for Development Effectiveness similarly 
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included the following minimum standards for civil society in its ‘Internationa l Framework for 
CSO Development Effectiveness’: 
  
1. Fulfilment of human rights obligations: freedoms of association and assembly, of 
expression, to operate without unwarranted state interference, of movement and 
travel; legal recognition facilitating CSO work and to secure resources for legitimate 
roles in development. 
2. CSOs as development actors in their own right, to be assured by governments and 
donors through legislation, policy and programming. 
3. Democratic political and policy dialogue: systematic inclusion of diverse views; 
transparency and clarity of purpose and process; free access to information, in the 
language of those being consulted; timeliness of consultations; recognition of the 
responsibilities and contributions of other actors, in particular local government 
representatives and administrations; and appropriate resources to enable full 
participation of all stakeholders. 
4. Accountability and transparency, of development priorities, strategies, plans and 
actions by governments, and a clearly defined place and role for CSOs in donor 
strategies and plans. 
5. Enabling financing, including long-term results orientation, responsiveness to CSO 
initiatives, access for diverse CSOs and coalitions, predictable, transparent, clear 
and harmonised terms, promoting local resource mobilisation, and supporting the full 
range of CSO programming and innovation, policy development and advocacy 
(Swiss NGO Platform 2015). 
 
4  Donor ‘pushback’ against closing civic 
space: an overview 
 
4.1 Categorising donor responses 
Donors have made a number of efforts to respond to or push back against closing civic 
space in development partner countries. Their responses have included documenting and 
analysing the issue, adopting remote operations where needed, improving communication 
strategies and analysing risk, encouraging CSOs to reduce dependence on international 
funding, scaling back contentious activities, providing emergency funds for partners, and 
exploring new ways of supporting civil society (Carothers 2015). The European Union (EU) 
had responded with (1) diplomatic and foreign policy instruments such as multilateral 
dialogue, and (2) a series of funding mechanisms such as: emergency funds to react to 
partner crises such as arrests of activists or banned organisations; more flexible 
organisational funding to support CSO capacities to respond in challenging new 
environments; and funding mechanisms for civil society activism, networking and alliance-
building. However, an assessment of the EU response concluded that there was a need for 
a more ‘concrete engagement on the structural roots of the shrinking space’ that tackled 
both the immediate and longer-term aspects of the challenge, as a political and a 
developmental issue (Youngs and Echagüe 2017).  
 
Other assessments such as a 2015 review of donor responses similarly noted that strategic 
and policy efforts have been weak, poorly coordinated or misaligned across the international 
aid system. Actions that required international policy and political coordination were more 
challenging. Several divisions within and between donor countries were found to hamper 
collective action to address civic space: 
 Different US and European perspectives: some Europeans initially viewed closing 
space as mainly of concern to US human rights groups. Views have harmonised 
15 
 
more recently, as European organisations are increasingly affected. But there remain 
differences in their approaches to human rights abuses and civic space – notably an 
American preference for naming and shaming, over a European preference for quiet 
diplomacy that keeps doors open for dialogue and engagement. 
 Private vs public funders’ interests: private foundations may be reluctant to build 
coalitions with official aid donors to address civic space, if they fear government 
involvement may exacerbate the situation, or if they are otherwise opposed to official 
policies of aid donor countries.  
 Development vs politics: funders focused more on development and service delivery 
may be reluctant to act in solidarity with more ‘political’ human rights defenders, 
democracy activists or social movements, for fear of jeopardising their own space or 
government relationships.  
 Aid to civil society: donors and civil society groups are themselves divided on the 
extent to which foreign funding is itself at fault, by funding CSOs and 
professionalised NGOs that some see as lacking in local legitimacy or support. Some 
see solutions to the closing space problem as only possible with significant changes 
to this model of civil society assistance (Carothers 2015). 
 
Reports on donor responses to the closure of civic space were reviewed for their analysis of 
actions that were already being taken, and of the gaps or shortcomings of the donor and 
recommended responses. These have been classified here into four groups, according to 
their aims and strategies for resisting or coping with closing space: 
 
1. Policy and strategic efforts, chiefly to persuade or pressure governments to adhere to 
national, regional and international laws, norms and policy processes regarding civic 
space, and the coordination of those efforts at international and regional levels.  
2. Operational responses, mainly to provide emergency protection to grantees or 
human rights defenders, and to adapt programming and reporting requirements.  
3. Alliance-building and civil society resilience efforts, intended to strengthen civil 
society’s own position within the broader society, including with the private sector. 
4. Evidence-generation, to document and monitor threats to civic space, and to make 
the ‘business case’ for and positive counter-narratives against civil society. 
 
Reports on donor responses to closing civic space noted an uneven response, with 
significant efforts on the operational response (2), but more limited strategic or longer-term 
(1 and 3) responses, and few that challenged national governments directly on policy or 
legal grounds (1). Efforts to address the evidence base have been largely limited to 
documenting formal closures of civic space through changes in laws, administrative 
regulations, and criminalisation of civil society actors and the media (Ariadne/ European 
Foundation Centre (EFC)/ International Human Rights Funders Group (IHRFG) 2015; 
Howard et al. 2015; International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) 2018). Documentation 
and analysis of the wider effects in terms of human rights violations or development 
outcomes has been patchy, at best. Table 4.1 summarises the recommendations of key 
reports on responses to civic space, and classifies them according to their aims and 
strategies. These analyses identify both significant gaps in the donor responses, and 
opportunities for further action.  
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Table 4.1 Recommended donor responses to closing civic space 
Report Aims and strategies of recommended responses 
Joshi Ariadne/ European Foundation 
Centre /International Human Rights 
Funders Group (2015)  
Strategic & 
policy 
Operational & 
programmatic 
Alliance-
building, 
resilience 
Evidence-
generation 
Economic interests: align with potential 
corporate allies, strengthen strategies to 
hold corporations who benefit from the 
closing space to account, and make the 
business case for civil society 
    
Counter the impact of counter-terrorism 
policies on civil society, including 
supporting NGOs to manage the 
negative impacts of the Financial Action 
Task Force (FATF) and other aspects of 
financial services for NGO actors 
    
SDGs and other international 
development processes can convene 
key actors in development, humanitarian 
and human rights fields, particularly on 
SDG 16 
    
Bring together international human 
rights norm-setting with domestic legal 
reform initiatives to strengthen 
institutions of accountability  
    
Strengthen and diversify counter-
narratives around the value and 
contribution of civil society 
    
Strengthen diplomatic response to civil 
society pushback, including addressing 
‘capture’ of regional mechanisms such 
as the Council of Europe by repressive 
states 
 
 
   
Strengthen long-term security and 
resilience of human rights defenders 
and NGOs, with data and legal 
protection, accounting/auditing and 
governance, fostering resilience of 
movements 
   
  
 
 
ACT Alliance/CIDSE (2015) Strategic & 
policy 
Operational & 
programmatic 
Alliance-
building, 
resilience 
Evidence-
generation 
Gather information to support CSO 
objectives and monitor human rights 
abuses 
    
Build formal and informal coalitions 
across levels and sectors to create 
space for sharing knowledge, raising 
issues, increasing legitimacy and 
influence, and securing funds 
    
Avoid burdening CSO partners with 
excessive reporting, leading to ‘upward’ 
accountability to donors rather than to 
local communities 
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Protection, risk analysis and mitigation 
for CSOs, human rights defenders, 
journalists, lawyers 
    
CSOs and indigenous and minority 
groups need systematic involvement in 
development policymaking  
    
CSOs must build close links with 
communities, enabling participatory and 
popular education methodologies to 
bring citizen voice to bear on public 
policy 
    
Funding policies and practices should 
strengthen CSO independence, treating 
CSOs as equal partners, rather than as 
dependent grantees 
    
CSOs need support to generate local 
and independent revenue streams, 
including accessing local philanthropy 
and corporate social responsibility 
    
Laws that restrict NGO activity against 
human rights law must be repealed; 
CSOs cannot operate effectively without 
the independence and freedoms to 
which they are entitled under these laws 
    
The right of citizens to peacefully 
assemble, march and protest on matters 
of public concern must be safeguarded, 
in law and in practice 
    
Security forces responsible for the 
aggressive repression of social protest 
or human rights activity must be 
investigated and prosecuted 
    
Effective systems to manage funds in an 
accountable and transparent manner 
must be put in place 
    
International Center for Not-for-Profit 
Law report (2018) 
Strategic & 
policy 
Operational & 
programmatic 
Alliance-
building, 
resilience 
Evidence-
generation 
Articulate a clear vision of support for 
civil society as part of their development 
and foreign policy statements 
    
Commit to long-term support for what is 
an ongoing challenge, and be ‘nimble 
and ready to adapt responses in 
innovative ways’ 
    
Strive toward policy coherence and 
coordination, between development and 
foreign policy 
    
Empower civil society to respond by 
monitoring civic space, facilitating 
collaboration, supporting public 
engagement, building CSO 
accountability, resilience and capacity, 
raising public awareness of civic space; 
and providing diplomatic support to civil 
society actors where needed 
    
Adapt aid modalities to current realities, 
recognising the need to sustain a more 
diverse array of CSOs with flexible 
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funding, long-term core support, non-
financial support, and funding for 
informal groups and movements  
Galvanise governments to defend and 
expand civic space, strengthen 
independent institutions, dialogue with 
governments, multi-stakeholder 
collaboration on global and regional 
norms protecting civic space, monitoring 
and implementation of 2030 Agenda; 
enabling research on civic space issues 
    
Facilitate cooperation with the private 
sector on human rights and civic space 
issues, identifying private sector allies 
and integrating them into multi-
stakeholder spaces, supporting 
voluntary standards on business 
practices and human rights monitoring, 
and cooperation with private sector 
associations 
    
 
 
4.2 SDC survey responses: key issues for joint learning 
Some of the key issues facing members of the SDC DDLG and Conflict and Human Rights 
(CHR) networks were uncovered by a 2018 survey, which drew on experiences and 
knowledge of conditions in some 24 countries. The results of that survey are presented in 
Table 4.2, adopting the same four headings used in Table 4.1. This sets out a broad 
framework within which SDC can reflect on its own current portfolio of responses, and any 
gaps and shortcomings, as well as feasible further interventions. This should also take into 
account the overview analysis of donor responses sketched above, with their assessment of 
the overall gaps, and specific recommendations. 
 
It should be noted that the responses from the SDC survey are a close fit with other 
analyses of donor responses to civic space closures, as set out in Table 4.1. SDC staff were 
most likely to identify operational and programmatic areas for learning about how to respond 
to civic space, but also identified learning aims with respect to how to address the strategic 
and policy dimensions of the challenge, as well as in relation to building alliances with and 
for civil society.  
 
The SDC survey raises a number of additional critical questions about the gaps in 
knowledge and its practical application to SDC programme and operational design, related 
to the necessity of tailoring the response to each specific country context. These questions 
draw attention to several key gaps in the evidence base – for instance, around how to make 
sense of or work with ‘civil society’ in the fragile or authoritarian contexts featuring in many of 
the countries in which SDC is working. There may be additional value to SDC’s joint learning 
about shrinking civic space from taking account of the different political systems and civil 
society–state relations as they affect country programmes, as was outlined above. A 
comparative understanding of the political drivers of closing civic space and of state–civil 
society relations in shaping its outcomes should help with the design of a politically informed 
and organisationally strategic approach in each country office and sector.  
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Table 4.2 Key questions for SDC joint learning about responding to closing civic 
space 
SDC DDLG & CHR network survey, 
2018  
Key issues for learning about 
responding to closing civic space 
Strategic 
& policy 
Operational & 
programmatic 
Alliance-
building, 
resilience 
Evidence-
generation 
Emergency responses: support to civil 
society actors in exile, including the 
programmatic risks from remote 
programming; effective and innovative 
approaches to risk mitigation; measuring 
results without endangering civil society 
groups 
 
 
   
Programmatic or operational: adapting 
SDC’s future governance/ decentralisation 
programming to address the enabling 
environment for civic space 
    
Monitoring, research, and knowledge-
sharing: identified a range of issues on 
which evidence was needed, including on 
experiences with civil society under 
authoritarianism; the ‘business case’ for 
civil society; experiences from around the 
world with combating closures of civic 
space; and monitoring the evolution of 
civic space nationally and at the local 
level 
    
CSO legitimacy and resilience: key 
concerns include the need for civil society 
to reach into wider society, beyond the 
main cities; to strengthen actors’ 
capacities to promote change while also 
promoting their independence and 
sustainability; countering the closure of 
civic space through local government; and 
to address the increasingly prevalent 
notion of a trade-off between civic space 
and poverty reduction 
    
Networking and mobilisation: fostering 
civil society networks and alliances in 
contexts where civic space is shrinking 
    
Engaging with alternative actors in the 
civic space: for instance, with business 
through multi-stakeholder platforms, 
decentralised social movements, the 
media and actors in the digital public 
space 
 
 
  
 
 
‘Counter-narratives’: key the need for 
‘winning arguments’ about the 
contributions of civil society, including to 
development policy, and with authoritarian 
or anti-democratic governments 
    
Policy engagement: experiences of 
engaging with governments, in multi-
stakeholder platforms, with business 
champions of civic space, and 
internationally, with the UN system and 
multilateral donors. 
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5   Profiles of donor activities to address 
shrinking space 
This section uses the four categories of donor responses described above to discuss the 
efforts of five donors: the UN, EU, the Department for International Development (DFID) 
(United Kingdom), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) and, 
more briefly, the Ford Foundation and Open Society Foundations. The profiles were 
developed using publicly available documentation, and involved no interviews, so some 
information may be out of date or incomplete. All sources are listed in the References 
section. 
 
 
5.1 The United Nations (UN) 
 
(Sources: OHCHR 2014; 2016; Baldus, Poppe and Wolff 2017)  
 
5.1.1 Operational and programmatic domains 
The UN has engaged in a range of operational and programmatic efforts to promote an 
enabling environment for civil society and to mobilise its various instruments to counter the 
effects of closing space. Taking note of the intimidation and threats faced by many CSOs on 
account of their cooperation with the UN, particularly on human rights issues, the Human 
Rights Council has adopted various resolutions, with annual reports from the Secretary-
General on such cases of reprisal. 
 
The UN General Assembly has taken note of the risks faced by human rights defenders, and 
in 2013, adopted its first-ever resolution on the systemic and structural violence faced by 
women human rights defenders in particular. Access to diverse sources of information, as a 
part of the right to freedom of expression, is considered to be an important characteristic of 
enabling environments for civil society, and the UN has scaled up efforts to include NGOs 
through webcast and remote participation in sessions of the Human Rights Council and 
treaty bodies. This is especially important for transparency and provides NGOs with a first-
hand improved understanding of international human rights mechanisms. OHCHR field 
presences also aim to improve access to information and increase long-term capacity 
building of CSOs. However, despite the range of UN responses for civil society support, 
many CSOs continue to struggle to access and benefit from these mechanisms due to strict 
requirements and other barriers to participation in UN fora in a consultative capacity.  
 
5.1.2 Building alliances, mobilising 
The UN Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of 
association is one of the main focal points for collaborative and coordinated responses to 
closing civic space. The Special Rapporteur plays a key role not only in gathering 
information and monitoring changes, but also building alliances with governments, NGOs, 
and other stakeholders, and leading regional dialogues on foreign funding restrictions in 
collaboration with the Community of Democracies. Field presences of OHCHR and other UN 
entities at country or regional levels also provide an important space for civil society actors 
to come together and form networks among themselves, as well to discuss and collaborate 
with government officials and representatives. Inter-governmental bodies such as the 
Human Rights Council are also an important avenue for alliance-building and collaboration 
on civic space issues. The UN supports states’ formal and informal consultations with CSOs, 
and documents effective participatory processes in numerous reports. SDG target 17.17 
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further provides a platform for the promotion and improvement of public, public–private and 
civil society partnerships.  
 
5.1.3 Strategic and policy directions 
OHCHR plays a leading role in strategically mobilising various UN bodies and instruments 
on issues of closing civic space. It should be noted that human rights have greater traction 
with some UN agencies and bodies than with others. OHCHR works with a range of UN 
agencies and funds such as the World Health Organization (WHO), UN Refugee Agency, 
UNICEF, the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), with the goal of maximising the impact of 
human rights work. UN mechanisms further provide for the review of legislation in order to 
ensure compliance with international human rights standards, particularly to ensure that 
‘laws on national security and counter-terrorism, money-laundering and incitement to hatred 
address legitimate concerns without encroaching on human rights and civil society activity’ 
(OHCHR 2016). The implementation of human rights regulations is regularly monitored by 
panels of experts established by international human rights treaties. The contribution of civil 
society to these bodies is encouraged, particularly to ensure relevance, legitimacy and 
accountability. CSOs are invited to participate in various platforms such as international 
conferences and meetings, with opportunities available through submissions, organising 
briefings, and networking among participants. However, the extent, reach and implications of 
CSO participation in UN efforts to counter closing civic space is unclear.  
 
5.1.4 Evidence 
The UN special rapporteurs play a key role in gathering and collating authoritative data on 
human rights abuses, and in generating dialogue about these issues. Information about civic 
space closures is disseminated through the UN’s convening role in review and monitoring 
processes, and through UN resolutions. 
 
 
5.2 European Union (EU) 
 
(Sources: Baldus et al. 2017; Youngs and Echagüe 2017; European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) 2018) 
 
5.2.1 Operational and programmatic domains 
The EU’s strongest responses to closing civic space can be located within the operational 
and programmatic domains of activity. The protection of human rights defenders has 
emerged as a priority and is a major focus of funding from the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). The EIDHR, with EUR 1.3 billion available for 
2014-2020, provides financial support to an Emergency Fund that covers: legal fees, 
medical expenses, and the evacuation of human rights defenders; a protection mechanism 
known as ProtectDefenders.eu, which swiftly coordinates protection and funding for human 
rights defenders at risk; and a crisis facility that organises emergency response in contexts 
where the EU cannot launch calls for proposals.  
 
Since 2014, the EU has been developing civil society roadmaps to strengthen Europe’s 
association with civil society. By 2017, more than 100 of these had been finalised and were 
being implemented, through dialogue, CSO operational support, and operational research. 
The roadmaps have enabled a more comprehensive approach to civil society, beyond 
providing operational or financial support, and have helped further policy dialogue, agenda-
setting, and joint programme processes between EU members states and partner countries. 
These roadmaps also contain measures to support ‘freedom of association and an “enabling 
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environment” for CSOs’ and provide for support to counter restrictive registration and foreign 
funding rules, develop domestic revenue sources for NGOs, as well as EU support through 
mentoring. The EU has also begun working towards greater flexibility in funding modalities 
by expanding criteria for eligible recipient organisations; guidelines for the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument further commit to maintain and not reduce financial support for 
civil society in restrictive environments. The roadmaps are geared towards boosting civil 
society participation in general; efforts specifically geared towards addressing shrinking 
space are comparatively limited, but include pressure for easier registration for CSOs, tax 
incentives for NGOs to increase domestic income, mentoring and support to evade 
restrictions on foreign funding, and support for business–civil society alliances.  
 
5.2.2 Building alliances, mobilising 
While EU efforts to align and coordinate donor interests and responses have been limited to 
date, gradual progress is being made to build cooperation with CSO networks and alternate 
forms of civil society actors. Through 23 Framework Partnership Agreements with various 
civil society networks, the EU has committed to financial support as well as a partnership to 
support enabling environment concerns. Under the Development Cooperation Instrument, 
between 2015 and 2017, the Civil Society Organisations and Local Authorities programme 
aimed to support the role of CSOs in pushing for improved governance and accountability, 
and to strengthen networks of CSOs at the regional and global levels.  
 
The EU further supports various civic space-related initiatives in collaboration with other 
states, CSOs and donors, including the European Endowment for Democracy, the 
Community of Democracies Working Group on Enabling and Protecting Civil Society, the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Study Group on Freedoms of 
Association and Assembly, and EuroMed Rights (formerly the Euro-Mediterranean Human 
Rights Network). The EU has further broadened its definition of human rights defenders in 
order to support those activists working outside the human rights domain, and EU donors 
have begun to express interest in funding alternate civil society recipients such as informal 
social movements and social enterprises. However, the support received by these new civic 
actors remains minimal. The EU could also do more to integrate closing civic space issues 
with the SDGs and has yet to cooperate more systematically with pro-civic space private 
sector actors.  
 
5.2.3 Strategic and policy directions 
While the EU has scaled up support for national human rights institutions and has been 
proactive in its use of UN instruments and procedures, the overall strategic response 
remains weak, failing to move beyond abstract support for enabling environments to 
concrete diplomatic efforts that support broader policy responses to closing space. Foreign 
policy instruments such as conditionality are not applied to the issue of civic space, and the 
EU continues to offer new agreements, aid and trade to regimes that are highly repressive 
towards civil society actors. This suggests a lack of coherence with respect to commitment 
to democratic values in the face of economic and geostrategic concerns on the part of donor 
governments, weakening any pressure on repressive governments. Collaboration across 
trade, aid, defence and other platforms would allow for a stronger, more coordinated 
diplomatic response that better engages with the complex political realities of closing space 
contexts.  
 
5.2.4 Evidence, data collection and monitoring 
No specific EU programmes of research or monitoring of closing civic space were identified. 
Under specific research commissions, organisations such as the European Center for Not-
for-Profit Law (ECNL) and iCON (the International Consortium on Closing Civic Space) have 
been involved in specific data-gathering exercises and analyses on behalf of the EU. One 
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analysis of the EU response identified a need for stronger political analysis capacity in 
responding to closing civic space. It also noted that EU capacity to monitor human rights 
issues had declined with a recent reduction in human rights officers in the European 
External Action Service. A report on civic space in the EU noted the absence of systematic 
monitoring or data collection on attacks on human rights activists within the EU, in contrast 
to the context outside the EU, which is more systematically monitored, and the ability 
therefore of European countries or civil societies to identify trends or take action.   
  
 
5.3 UK Department for International Development (DFID) 
 
(Sources: DFID 2018; 2017; 2016; DFID and HM Treasury 2015; Digital Defenders 
Partnership n.d.; Youngs and Echagüe 2017; Baldus et al. 2017; CSO Lifeline n.d.; ICNL 
2014) 
 
5.3.1 Operational and programmatic domains 
While DFID’s transparency agenda and Civil Society Partnership Review (CSPR) contain 
mentions of the ‘environment in which CSOs operate’ and take note of increasing risks and 
threats to CSOs, journalists, human rights defenders, and other activists around the world, 
evidence of DFID programming specific to the challenge of closing civic space is minimal. 
Based on the findings of the CSPR, DFID highlights the importance of building capacity and 
resilience among CSOs in order to give them a more prominent leadership role, but these 
strategic directives are undercut by funding modalities that may pose barriers to funding and 
support for small- and medium-sized CSOs operating in restrictive environments. For 
example, CSOs consulted in the CSPR have pointed out that excessive requirements in the 
application process for DFID funding make it difficult for organisations to successfully apply. 
DFID has further signalled a shift away from core funding for CSOs towards ‘open, 
competitive programmes’ based on CSOs’ ability to ‘demonstrate effective delivery and 
value for money’ – part of a broader move to prioritise national interest in its response to 
complex global challenges. 
  
5.3.2 Building alliances, mobilising 
DFID has scaled up efforts to support and build coalitions with CSOs, thinktanks, and public 
and private organisations in order to ‘find solutions to current complex situations whilst 
tackling tomorrow’s challenges’. One of the key points raised by CSOs as part of the CSPR 
was the importance of working together to improve learning and flexible responses to 
challenges, particularly in difficult contexts. To this end, DFID has launched the UK Aid 
Connect programme to facilitate greater collaboration on various selected themes, which 
include ‘building civil society effectiveness’ and ‘building open societies’, both pertinent to 
the challenge of closing civic space. DFID has also demonstrated commitment towards the 
protection of digital freedoms and free media in restrictive regulatory environments and has 
linked civil society groups with global transparency initiatives. Along with other donors, DFID 
has funded initiatives such as the Digital Defenders Partnership (managed by Hivos), which 
provides emergency support to a range of internet users such as journalists, bloggers, and 
human rights defenders facing acute risk in repressive environments. The UK is also a 
member of the Community of Democracies Working Group on Enabling and Protecting Civil 
Society (through the UK Charity Commission), and supports the Lifeline Embattled CSO 
Assistance Fund, which provides financial support and rapid response advocacy grants to 
civic actors under threat or attack.  
 
5.3.3 Strategic and policy directions 
DFID efforts to develop networks with a range of actors – while an important step towards an 
informed, coordinated response to closing civic space – have largely been unaccompanied 
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by a broader political and diplomatic strategy to engage and pressure governments that 
maintain repressive civil society environments. In its 2015 aid strategy, DFID commits to 
engage in a ‘cross-government approach’ that allows for aid to be distributed by drawing on 
the skills and expertise of other government departments, but it is unclear how improved 
collaboration will be used not only to deliver aid more effectively but also to support civil 
society in difficult contexts. The CSPR identifies the increasing role of emerging countries in 
the political economy of global development, but there is no evidence to suggest that DFID 
is engaging with China or other major players on the issue of closing of civil society space. It 
is also unclear whether DFID is utilising bilateral, multilateral and regional legal and policy 
instruments to hold repressive governments to account.  
 
5.3.4 Evidence, data collection and monitoring 
DFID is funding a range of initiatives that combine learning and practice about civic space, 
open societies, and effective CSOs through the Aid Connect programme. Other relevant 
DFID-funded research includes the A4EA (Action for Empowerment and Accountability) 
programme, focusing on fragile and conflict-affected states. DFID has also funded smaller 
studies by the Institute of Development Studies on the implications of closing civic space for 
development outcomes. 
 
 
5.4 Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) 
 
(Sources: Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden n.d.; Topsøe-Jensen et al. 2018; Baldus et al. 
2017) 
 
5.4.1 Operational and programmatic domains 
The promotion of an enabling environment for civil society is a central part of Sida’s work in 
the development sector, with over one-third of funds available to the agency being 
channelled to and through CSOs. Moreover, Sweden’s 2014 strategy for special initiatives 
for democratisation and human rights amounts to US$120 million per year. One of the two 
main objectives of Sweden’s strategy for support via CSOs is the promotion of an enabling 
environment, which includes increasing opportunities for CSOs to promote such an 
environment, strengthening mechanisms for collaboration and coordination in developing 
countries, and improving aid and development effectiveness in Swedish support for civil 
society.  
 
Much of Sweden’s response to the closing of civic space comes through its long-time core 
and project funding for CIVICUS, with the provision of SEK 80.5 million between 2014 and 
2018. The Civic Space Initiative (CSI), funded by Sida, and bringing together CIVICUS, 
Article 19, the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) and the World Movement for 
Democracy, aims to protect civic space by supporting journalists, human rights defenders 
and other groups at risk, and by providing networking and research support. According to 
CIVICUS, Sida, as a strong donor in this field, can be described as ‘flexible, cooperative, 
and risk-taking’, making longer-term strategic commitments and emphasising core funding.  
 
5.4.2 Building alliances, mobilising 
Sweden also plays a key role in increasing global collaboration and cooperation on civic 
space issues. Sweden’s strategy for support via CSOs emphasises the importance of 
‘bridgebuilders’ and convening civil society, as well as interaction with other actors such as 
governments and political parties. To further support political participation through innovation 
and technology, Sweden – along with the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
Omidyar Network, launched Making All Voices Count in 2013.  
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One of the main goals of the CSI is to target public audiences and create counter-narratives 
that increase engagement and support for civil society. Swedish engagement with CSOs 
aims to promote local ownership and utilise existing organisational forms for more relevant 
and effective development cooperation. The Innovation for Change initiative, funded jointly 
by Sida and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has set up six 
regional innovation hubs to increase collaborative learning opportunities and build capacity 
among CSOs. Sida is also a member of the Community of Democracies Working Group on 
Enabling and Protecting Civil Society, and supports the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights Study Group on Freedoms of Association and Assembly, the Digital 
Defenders Partnership, the Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund, the Prague Civil 
Society Centre, and EuroMed Rights.  
 
5.4.3 Strategic and policy directions 
Within a range of strategic and policy directions, Sweden’s response is strongest in relation 
to its use of bilateral, multilateral and regional policy and legal instruments to address the 
closing of civic space. For example, one of the main goals of the CSI is to exert influence 
over policy actors through lobbying and advocacy activities at the global (e.g. the UN), 
regional and national levels to protect civic space. For example, through CSI, Sweden has 
made efforts to link civil society with the UN Universal Periodic Review mechanism and the 
special procedures of the UN Human Rights Council. Sweden was also actively involved in 
efforts to strengthen the mandate of the UN special rapporteurs, particularly the Special 
Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, in 2010. 
While the use of UN instruments to support civic space represents an important aspect of 
strategic responses to the issue, it is unclear whether Sweden has mobilised diplomatic and 
foreign policy efforts, or engaged across trade and security platforms in order to create a 
coordinated response that exerts pressure on governments that continue to restrict civic 
space.  
 
5.4.4 Evidence, data collection and monitoring 
Sida played a key early and consistent role in supporting evidence-generation about the 
closures of civic space, through funding for monitoring and analysis by civil society and 
thinktank coalitions such as CIVICUS, the ICNL and other prominent civil society groups. 
 
 
5.5 The Ford Foundation and the Open Society Foundations  
 
(Sources consulted: Open Society Foundations n.d.(a), n.d.(b), n.d.(c); Ford Foundation 
n.d.(a), n.d.(b), n.d.(c)) 
 
5.5.1 Operational and programmatic domains 
While Ford Foundation and Open Society Foundations programming does not directly 
address the closing of civic space, issues of human rights, civic engagement and internet 
freedoms are key parts of the respective organisations’ work on challenging inequality. The 
Open Society Foundations’ Human Rights Initiative supports a range of groups that work 
with those whose rights have been violated. Ford Foundation’s Civic Engagement and 
Government strategy seeks to support groups that ‘make policy more responsive, to enable 
people to determine public agendas and priorities, and to reclaim and rebuild trust in 
government’, while its Justice Initiative focuses on legal work rather than grants, and 
challenges restrictions on freedom of speech and of assembly in the face of abuse of power. 
Digital freedoms are an important area of work for both organisations, with support provided 
to partner organisations that work on social justice issues, including privacy and freedom of 
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expression. While not a direct response to closing space issues, Ford Foundation’s Building 
Institutions and Networks (BUILD) programme – a five-year, US$1 billion investment – aims 
to strengthen the long-term, core capabilities of social justice organisations, the need for 
which is especially urgent in repressive environments. 
 
5.5.2 Building alliances, resilience 
Ford Foundation and the Open Society Foundations are highly active in their efforts to 
collaborate with CSOs, donors and other actors to align responses to the closing of civic 
space. Both organisations’ efforts to promote digital freedoms are further expanded through 
their support for NetGain: Working Together for a Stronger Digital Society, along with the 
John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation, Knight Foundation, and Mozilla Foundation. 
Ford Foundation and the Open Society Foundations also provide support to The Funders’ 
Initiative for Civil Society, which aims to support funders in aligning their efforts to counter 
negative trends in civil society space, as well as EuroMed Rights’ Shrinking Space for Civil 
Society project. Ford Foundation also supports the Fund for Human Rights’ Activism Under 
Threat programme, which supports human rights defenders and human rights organisations 
in restrictive environments, and the Open Society Foundations has provided funding for the 
Human Rights and Democracy Network’s Enabling Environment for Civil Society working 
group. 
 
5.5.3 Strategic and policy directions 
While Ford Foundation and the Open Society Foundations are fully engaged in alliance-
building and the mobilisation of various actors, and carry out some programmatic work 
relevant to the closing of civic space, it is unclear whether they are involved in strategic and 
policy support through national, regional and global policy and legal instruments – 
particularly within the UN framework. As private donors, they are differently positioned in 
their ability to pressure governments that restrict civic space. They have the potential to 
increase engagement with diverse actors such as businesses and contribute more 
effectively to the creation of positive counter-narratives on the value of civil society.  
 
5.5.4 Evidence, data collection and monitoring 
No specific activities were identified relating to generating evidence or data regarding 
combating shrinking civic space. 
 
 
 
  
 27 
References 
 
 
Al Jazeera (2018) ‘Abiy Ahmed Sworn in as Ethiopia’s Prime Minister’, Al Jazeera News, 2 
April 2018, www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/04/abiye-ahmed-sworn-ethiopia-prime-
minister-180402082621161.html(accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
Ansoms, A.; Marijnen, E.; Cioffo, G. and Murison, J. (2017) ‘Statistics Versus Livelihoods: 
Questioning Rwanda’s Pathway out of Poverty’, Review of African Political Economy 
44.151: 47–65, https://doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2016.1214119 (accessed 28 October 
2019) 
 
Ariadne/ European Foundation Centre (EFC)/International Human Rights Funders Group 
(IHRFG) (2015) Challenging the Closing Space for Civil Society: A Practical Starting 
Point for Funders, Berlin: Ariadne/European Foundation Centre/International Human 
Rights Funders Group, www.ariadne-network.eu/challenging-the-closing-space-for-
civil-society (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
Baldus, J.; Poppe, A.E. and Wolff, J. (2017) An Overview of Global Initiatives on Countering 
Closing Space for Civil Society, Washington DC: Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, www.csis.org/analysis/overview-global-initiatives-countering-closing-space-
civil-society (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
Carothers, T. (2015) ‘The Closing Space Challenge: How Are Funders Responding?’ 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace blog, 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/11/02/closing-space-challenge-how-are-funders-
responding-pub-61808 (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
CIVICUS (2016a) CIVICUS Monitor: Tracking Civic Space Worldwide: Findings Report, 
CIVICUS, www.civicus.org/images/CIVICUSMonitorFindingsReportOctober2016.pdf  
(accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
CIVICUS (2016b) State of Civil Society Report 2016, CIVICUS, 
www.civicus.org/index.php/socs2016 (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
CSO Lifeline n.d. ‘History & Funders’, The Lifeline Embattled CSO Assistance Fund,  
www.csolifeline.org  (accessed 6 November 2019)  
 
DFID (2018) Open Aid, Open Societies: A Vision for a Transparent World, London: 
Department for International Development, 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/open-aid-open-societies-a-vision-for-a-
transparent-world (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
DFID (2017) ‘UK Aid Connect’, www.gov.uk/international-development-funding/uk-aid-
connect (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
DFID (2016) DFID Civil Society Partnership Review, London: Department for International 
Development, www.gov.uk/government/publications/dfid-civil-society-partnership-
review (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
DFID and HM Treasury (2015) UK Aid: Tackling Global Challenges in the National Interest, 
Cm 9163, London: HM Treasury, www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-aid-tackling-
global-challenges-in-the-national-interest (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 28 
 
Digital Defenders Partnership n.d. ‘Digital Defenders Programme’, 
www.digitaldefenders.org/#section-about-us (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
Dupuy, K. and Prakash, A. (2017) ‘Do Donors Reduce Bilateral Aid to Countries with 
Restrictive NGO Laws?: A Panel Study, 1993-2012’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector 
Quarterly 47.1: 89–106, https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764017737384 (accessed 28 
October 2019) 
 
Ford Foundation n.d.(a) ‘Building Institutions and Networks’, Ford Foundation,  
www.fordfoundation.org/work/our-grants/building-institutions-and-networks (accessed 
29 October 2019) 
 
Ford Foundation n.d.(b) ‘Challenging Inequality: Technology and Society, Ford Foundation, 
www.fordfoundation.org/work/challenging-inequality/internet-freedom (accessed 29 
October 2019) 
 
Ford Foundation n.d.(c) ‘Challenging Inequality: Civic Engagement and Government’, Ford 
Foundation, www.fordfoundation.org/work/challenging-inequality/civic-engagement-
and-government/  (accessed 29 October 2019) 
 
FRA (2018) Challenges Facing Civil Society Organisations Working on Human Rights in the 
EU, Luxembourg: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2018/challenges-facing-civil-society-orgs-human-
rights-eu (accessed 29 October 2019) 
 
Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2017) Summary of the Second 
High Level Meeting of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-Operation, 
held in Nairobi, Kenya, 28 November – 1 December 2016, Nairobi: Global Partnership 
for Effective Development Co-Operation 
 
Hossain, N.; Khurana, N.; Mohmand, S.; Nazneen, S.; Oosterom, M.; Roberts, T.; Santos, 
R.; Shankland, A. and Schröder, P. (2018) What Does Closing Civic Space Mean for 
Development? A Literature Review and Proposed Conceptual Framework, IDS 
Working Paper 515, Brighton: IDS 
 
Howard, K.; Bresnihan, S.; Chirwa, W.; Mayaya, B. and Winstanley, L. (2015) How to 
Protect and Expand an Enabling Environment: Space for Civil Society, Geneva and 
Brussels: ACT Alliance/ Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la 
Solidarité 
 
ICNL (2018) Effective Donor Responses to the Challenge of Closing Civic Space, 
Washington DC: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law, 
www.icnl.org/news/2018/7%20May.html (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
ICNL (2014) A Mapping of Existing Initiatives to Address Legal Constraints on Foreign 
Funding of Civil Society, Washington DC: International Center for Not-for-Profit Law  
 
Kiai, M. (2017) Imagining a World Without Participation: Mapping the Achievements of Civil 
Society, Former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and of Association (2011–17), Final Report, Human Rights Council, 
http://freeassembly.net/reports/civil-society/ (accessed 29 October 2019) 
 
 29 
Mendelson, S.E. (2015) Why Governments Target Civil Society and What Can Be Done in 
Response: A New Agenda, CSIS Human Rights Initiative, Washington DC: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies 
 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden n.d. ‘Stand with Civil Society – Sweden’, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs Sweden,  
www.regeringen.se/contentassets/916c6405ef0c41a39b688ca7f28fda14/stand-with-
civil-society---sweden (accessed 29 October 2019)  
 
OHCHR (2017a) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful 
Assembly and of Association, Report to the UN General Assembly on the rights to 
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Annalisa Ciampi, submitted in 
accordance with Human Rights Council resolution 32/32. A/72/135, New York: United 
Nations  
 
OHCHR (2017b) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights 
Defenders, Report to the UN General Assembly A/HRC/34/52, Geneva: Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/SRHRDefenders/Pages/SRHRDefendersIndex.aspx 
(accessed 29 October 2019) 
 
OHCHR (2016) Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on Civil Society, 
Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
www.ohchr.org/EN/AboutUs/Pages/ReportHConCivilSociety.aspx (accessed 29 
October 2019) 
 
OHCHR (2014) Civil Society Space and the United Nations Human Rights System: A 
Practical Guide for Civil Society, Geneva: Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, 
www.ohchr.org/Documents/AboutUs/CivilSociety/CS_space_UNHRSystem_Guide.pdf 
(accessed 29 October 2019) 
 
Open Society Foundations n.d.(a) ‘Human Rights Initiative’, Open Society Foundations, 
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/programs/human-rights-initiative (accessed 29 
October 2019) 
 
Open Society Foundations n.d.(b) ‘Information Program’, Open Society Foundations, 
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/programs/information-program (accessed 29 
October 2019) 
 
Open Society Foundations n.d.(c) ‘Open Society Justice Initiative’, Open Society 
Foundations, www.opensocietyfoundations.org/about/programs/open-society-justice-
initiative (accessed 29 October 2019) 
 
Rocha Menocal, A. (2017) ‘Political Settlements and the Politics of Transformation: Where 
Do “Inclusive Institutions” Come From?’ Journal of International Development 29.5: 
559–75, https://doi.org/10.1002/jid.3284  (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
Sauer, S.; Leite, A.; Oliveira, K. and Shankland, A. (2019) ‘The Implications of Closing Civic 
Space for Sustainable Development in Brazil’, mimeo, IDS and ACT Alliance, 
https://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/handle/123456789/14507 (accessed 29 October 
2019) 
 
Swiss NGO Platform (2015) Enabling Environment for Civil Society, Discussion paper, 
Zurich/Berne: SWISS NGO Platform 
 30 
 
Tang, S-Y. and Zhan, X. (2008) ‘Civic Environmental NGOs, Civil Society, and 
Democratisation in China’, The Journal of Development Studies 44.3: 425–48, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/00220380701848541(accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
Topsøe-Jensen, B.; Obery, I.; Chaturvedi, K. and Bisiaux, R. (2018) Evaluation of CIVICUS 
– World Alliance for Citizen Participation, Final Report, Stockholm: Sida, 
www.sida.se/contentassets/7abcc4b207e543fc87ccf5bff5a7c931/de2018_4_62129en.
pdf (accessed 29 October 2019) 
 
UN (2015) Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 
A/RES/70/1, New York: United Nations 
 
UNDP (2006) UNDP and Civil Society Organizations: A Toolkit for Strengthening 
Partnerships, New York: United Nations Development Programme 
 
van der Borgh, C. and Terwindt, C. (2012) ‘Shrinking Operational Space of NGOs – A 
Framework of Analysis’, Development in Practice 22.8: 1065–81, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2012.714745 (accessed 28 October 2019) 
 
Youngs, R. and Echagüe, A. (2017) Shrinking Space for Civil Society: The EU Response, 
Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy 
Department, https://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/04/21/shrinking-space-for-civil-society-eu-
response-pub-68743 (accessed 29 October 2019) 
